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Abstract. We propose a security model for open multi-agent systems. Given a user-dened
task T , we generate a set of mobile agents which realize a common functionality that solves
T . Those agents co-operate with each other and build an autonomous community. Using
a scheme for secure distributed computations, this community is able to perform secure
computations without requiring interaction with a trusted party. For this paper, we have
chosen Canetti's model for secure multi-party computations (see [Can01]). Unfortunately,
the problems arising from the migration of agents are not covered by this technique. We
present an extended model that oers a solutions to this. Thus, we yield guarantees for con-
dentiality of secret data, detection of unauthorised code and data changes, reestablishment
of corrupted agents and prevention from malicious routing.
1 Introduction
Mobile agents are designed to roam the network autonomously and have their code
executed by foreign hosts. (Details about multi-agent systems can be found in [Wei99].)
They are the consequent answer to our growing networks as well as to the user's need
to collect, lter and process huge amounts of information even though his bandwidth or
computing resources might be limited. The broad range of applications includes mobile
computing, information retrieval in large repositories and e-commerce applications like
price negotiations. But until now there is no general solution to the security problems
in such open multi-agent systems. Some authors (see e.g. [ST98],[LM99]) worked on a
technique called "function hiding" to achieve condentiality of the computation and
protection against software-piracy. In a function hiding scheme a sender A encrypts a
function f he wants to be executed by a second party B. Then B evaluates the encrypted
function E(f) on his input x. The result E(f)(x) is returned to A and decrypted by him,
yielding the result of f(x). Yet, the published approaches can only hide limited classes
of functions.
A dierent approach is to obfuscate the code, in a way that the functionality is
preserved, but nobody can see how it works. As anyone knows, it is hard to understand
source code. Motivated by this, Hohl suggests in [Hoh97] to mess up source code by
the use of insane variable identiers and completely unstructured implementation to
make it even harder to comprehend. Unfortunately, the readability can be improved by
compilation and subsequent de-compilation.
Most of the preceeding research aimed at the construction of an obfuscating compiler
because the availability of an eÆcient method for obfuscating programs is very important
for the use of mobile agents. A nal point to this research was reached in October 2001
when Barak et. al. (see [BGI01]) proved that the existence of such a compiler is impossible
as long as one requires the resulting program to have a virtual black box property. This
result does not mean that any research in function hiding is obsolete. There is still hope
to nd function hiding schemes like homomorphic encryption, but they would not oer
an eÆcient way to construct an obfuscating compiler.
It seems to be hard to secure stand-alone agents. Therefore, we diverge from this and
consider a completely dierent approach. By using a community of collaborating mobile
agents, it is possible to increase reliability of the community's functionality by mutual
control.
Roth suggests this idea in [Rot99] by launching two agents that are controlling each
others functionality. A drawback of his approach is that as soon as one agent has been
corrupted, the system must halt. Since a corrupted agent could accuse the other of being
corrupted, it should not be possible for an agent to restart the other one. So, the joint
task can only be successfully nished if no agent gets corrupted on its journey. This might
be the reason that less attention has been payed to this idea.
We develop a model, in which we assume the agents not to communicate with their
originator before they have nished their job. Otherwise the originator would be forced
to stay online while his agents are working. The advantage of our proposal is, that
it is based on a mathematical model for secure multi-party computation. Several such
models have been published in the last decade. We have decided to use Canetti's recently
proposed security model (see [Can01]) because it is tailored to represent communication
networks like the Internet. Consequently, we do not have to demand all visited servers
to be trustful. It is suÆcient if the majority of our agents is not corrupted. This is
achieved by distributing the computational state and all sensitive data redundantly over
the participating agents.
The following presentation is structured into 3 sections. Section 2 is devoted to a
brief survey of Canetti's model and its use for the agent setting. In the next section,
we introduce a basic model in which the security problems arising by migration are still
unsolved. The extended model in section 4 lls that gap.
2 Canetti's model and its implications
2.1 Canetti's model
Consider one community of n agents that has been created for a particular task T . By
using a suitable migration control, there will be time periods in which no migration takes
place and all of the agents are hosted by dierent servers. This setting is the same as that
in secure multi-party computations because in that case several xed servers participate
in a joint calculation without requesting the servers to trust each other.
As mentioned above, our work is based on Canetti's denition of protocol security.
Now, we are going to establish a basis for the presentation of our ideas in sections 3 and
4 by sketching Canetti's model. Main criteria for our decision for it's use was, that it
provides security guarantees for arbitrary (even a priori unknown) concurrent environ-
ments with an asynchronous communication network, that delivers messages publicly,
unauthenticated and without guaranteed message delivery.
Assume n servers jointly computing a functionality F which is realized by an n-party-
protocol . These servers are capable to participate concurrently in several protocol runs.
Each of those executed programs is denoted as party. Furthermore, there is an adversary
A in Canetti's model that is able to corrupt a limited number k of servers. In this
case, it can read the entire state (including its history) and control the behaviour of
these parties. Additionally, A has the power to read, modify, delay, and even delete
outgoing messages of all n parties. Each entity is modeled as a Turing machine with
two pairs of communication tapes. One for incoming/outgoing messages of the parties,
the other one for local protocol input/output. Another adversarial entity Z, which is
called the environment, represents everything outside the current protocol execution.
Z is responsible of delivering inputs to the parties since their origin is considered as
external. Notice that, both adversarial entities are distinguishable by their knowledge
and control. A knows and controls everything concerning messages between the parties,
but is unaware of the inputs/outputs of the protocol, and for Z it is vice versa. Both are
allowed to communicate with each other freely. The model is called \real-life-model". It
is illustrated in gure 6 in appendix A.
For the denition of a secure protocol, one has to suppose an ideal setting. Obviously,
no protocol execution can achieve more reliability than a protocol using a trusted entity
which gets the inputs from all parties and returns (correct) outputs. A real-life-model
supplemented with an unbounded number of such trusted entities for computing any
functionality F , is called F-hybrid-model. A protocol  in the real-life-model is called
secure, if
1. for any adversary attacking  there is one adversary in the F-hybrid-model and
2. no possible environment is able to decide whether it acts in a protocol execution
within the F-hybrid or the real-life model.
Therefore, the most interesting cases are those in which the \interactive distinguisher"
Z holds back some knowledge from A. This enables Z to check whether the protocol
outputs are correlated to this secret knowledge and, thus, might be able to dierentiate
the models.
Since our agent communities are supposed to work in the internet, we cannot presume
the existence of a broadcast channel. On account of this, we need Byzantine Agreements
(see [Gol95]) which limit the number k of corrupted parties to n=3 to obtain a protocol
that is secure in the sense of Canetti's denition. For our agent setting, this implies
that more than 2n=3 of the hosts must be honest during each time interval in which no
migration takes place.
2.2 Distributed computations
Since we want to secure the execution of arbitrary functions, we have to translate them
into a k-robust protocol. This has to be done because an adversary in our model is limited
to inuence less than k inputs. Several protocol compilers have been developed. See for
example [GMW87], [BGW88] and [CCD88]. In [GMW87] the resulting protocol is divided
in two steps. At rst, each party commits to its local input. To be able to detect a party
that deviates from the protocol the other parties possess shares of everyone's randomness.
The second part, the execution, is organised in several rounds. In each of them, every
party is activated at least once to perform computations and to send messages. The
correctness (in the sense of the protocol) of one party's activities are checked by the
others through a zero-knowledge proof. Messages of one round must have been delivered
until the beginning of the next round.
Canetti states in [Can01] that he does not know if [GMW87] is secure in his model. He
proposes the use of [BGW88] which provides an information-theoretic secure synchronous
protocol that stays secure in his setting. But also asynchronous networks can be handled
by using the techniques of [BCG93] and [BKR94]. In [BGW88], the authors use a veriable
secret sharing scheme (VSS) to enable the community to detect improper or missing
commitments in the rst step. The actual evaluation of the function is done in the second
phase.
2.3 Canetti Slices
To translate Canetti's model into a model for secure computations in multi-agent systems,
we rst have to x all participating entities of the system.
Instead of commissioning one agent to full a particular task, we use a community of
agents, which share their global state of computation redundantly and solve the task in
co-operation. For this purpose, the agents are able to communicate freely and to execute
distributed computations. We consider every agent as one of Canetti's parties and every
host as one of the servers (which are able to host several agents at the same time). There
is only one adversary in Canetti's model. In multi-agent systems, every host has to be
considered as possibly hostile. To manage this, we consider the community of malicious
hosts controlled by a kind of \super-adversary". This is plausible because:
{ In the worst case all malicious hosts co-operate and can be seen as one adversary.
{ Any set of separately working adversaries cannot cause more damage to the entity of
all n agents than one \super-adversary".
The \super-adversary" is consistent with Canetti's adversary and it is even stronger than
any adversary that could exist in a real agent system.
Obviously, we maintain every security guarantee given by Canetti, as long as we only
consider a time period in which no migration takes place. We call such a period Canetti
Slice. During this time interval an agent community consisting of n agents is executed
by n dierent hosts. What happens when a migration takes place? There again, we have
n agents executed by n dierent hosts, but one of them is new.
3 A model for a secure mobile agent community
In this section we start by dening a basic agent and a basic protocol that demonstrates
how a community with a distributed computational state could be realized. In this pro-
tocol we include a very rudimentary migration process. Any functionality that could be
used to solve a user-dened task T can be realised by such a protocol. Several security
risks arising by migration are not handled here, but will be treated in the next section.
3.1 The basic agent
Let A
j
be one of the n mobile agents, which have been designed for the fullment of a
task T . Like the classical agent, our basic agent can be roughly divided into code and
data. Its code C is the same as that of the other agents of his community, but it would
also be possible to provide it with an unique code. In any case C contains the information
about the size n of the agent community.
The agent's data consists of shared knowledge. Therefore, it is condential as long as
an adversary has not enough shares to reconstruct the secret information. Unfortunately,
in the basic model, the adversary is able to collect enough shares over the time. Later on
we solve this problem by resharing methods.
During its travel, A
j
enters a series of hosts H
0
;H
j1
; : : : ;H
jm
, whereby H
0
is the
one, on which he has been initialised. Entering a host H
ji
, the agent's database consists
of a set s
j
of shares that have been added as a result of distributed computations by
one of its preceeding hosts. Parts of s
j
are shares of a list Q that is used to control
the migration process and the entire knowledge about a location list L
c
. Unnecessary
or redundant knowledge may be deleted. This implies, that it is not always possible to
detect the supplier of wrong knowledge after the completion of the task.
3.2 The basic protocol
The protocol is divided into an initialisation phase on a trusted host H
0
and the execu-
tion/migration phase. Any communication between hosts is assumed to be done through
a secure channel. Every message contains a community id, which enables the receiver to
assign it to one of the agents hosted by him. Messages originated by an agent that is
not a member of the community are ignored. In the protocol this can be checked by a
location list L
c
.
In the following, we present the necessary subroutines that have to be executed by a
host on demand of the protocol:
The subroutine deliver
The function deliver has 2 parameters: a list L
0
 L
c
of receivers and a message m. If
A
k
is the rst element of Q
1
and the current host of A
k
is in L
0
, then the message m is
buered. The message m is sent to all conrmed members of L
0
.
The subroutine run
run is the most important function in our model. It is used to invocate k-robust n-party
sub-protocols, which are executed by the community. The function's parameters are: the
current location list L
c
, a protocol X, and an input r for the protocol X. The input r
is given to the local program that is part of the new protocol instance of X. It contains
randomness and possibly additional information.
The next host is determined by execution of the sub-protocol migrate (see gure 1).
The protocol could be invoked concurrently. Therefore, we require the termination of the
current migration process before the next one is going to be processed. The rst element
of Q can be used to check which call of migrate belongs to the current migration process.
1
In this case, A
k
is migrating, but his next host is not yet conrmed.
The functionality of sub-protocol migrate
1. If the input contains "Q" then
If not more than 2n=3 of "Q+" or "Q " of such calls arrived
store this request and exit.
Else
If #"Q+"> 2n=3 then inform every host to update L
c
and to send all messages
that have been buered for the rst element in Q to the new host.
Remove the rst element of Q.
Send a termination message to the old host.
If Q 6= fg then continue the protocol for the rst element of Q.
Else exit.
Else
append the request to Q
If jQj  1 exit.
2. Distributed computation of A
j
's next host H
j(i+1)
. It is not allowed to choose
a member of L
c
.
3. Broadcast of all resulting shares to all current hosts.
4. Reconstruction of H
j(i+1)
by each host.
5. Each host sends its L
c
to H
j(i+1)
.
Fig. 1. Functionality of migrate
Initialisation
1. The originator divides a database D in n redundant shares and distributes them
among the agents. Furthermore, each agent is provided with a code C.
2. H
0
computes a list L
c
= [H
11
; : : : ;H
n1
] containing the hosts of the rst Canetti Slice.
3. For all 1  j  n, the host H
0
sends the message (A
j
,"Agree?",H
0
) to Host H
j1
.
4. While there is any j with outstanding positive response:
If H
j1
sends "no", H
0
determines a new H
j1
, updates L
c
and sends
(A
j
,"Agree?",H
0
) to H
j1
.
If H
j1
sends "yes", H
0
makes an endorsement about H
j1
.
5. H
0
sends L
c
to all members of L
c
.
Migration cycle of A
j
on host H
ji
(i  1)
1. H
ji
makes a decision dec 2 f"yes","no"g about the execution of A
j
.
2. If H
j(i 1)
= H
0
then deliver(dec, H
0
),
else
while not more than 2n=3 location lists L
c
are available, store incoming
location lists sent by dierent servers.
Fix the current location list L
c
of all agents by a majority decision.
Then, H
ji
executes deliver(dec, L
c
).
If dec = "no", H
ji
deletes the agent,
else H
ji
starts the execution of A
j
.
3. During the execution the following events may occur
{ Calls of the function run((r;"Q+"); L
c
; migrate) if any host sends a positive re-
sponse concerning the execution of an agent. Calls of run((r;"Q "); L
c
; migrate)
in case of a negative response.
{ Local computations on shares
{ Invocation of a subroutine run(r; L;X) for distributed computations
{ Updates of the set of shares s
j
{ Forwarding of messages to A
j
{ Delivery of messages by execution of deliver(L
0
;m)
{ A
j
demands its migration, therefore, H
ji
calls run((r;"A
j
"); L
c
; migrate)
{ Receipt of the next host H
j(i+1)
. H
ji
exits the event loop.
4. After receiving the next host H
j(i+1)
, the agent A
j
is sent to it with the plea for an
agreement response.
While there is no termination message from c:
If there is a positive answer from H
j(i+1)
, then H
ji
calls
run((r;"Q+"); L
c
; migrate).
If there is a negative answer from H
j(i+1)
, then H
ji
calls
run((r;"Q "); L
c
; migrate).
H
ji
deletes A
j
.
3.3 Discussion
We consider an agent as corrupted when it has been maliciously modied on a host.
Additionally, its shares could be spied out by a host. But we do not consider such an
agent as corrupted because we will use a suitable resharing method in our extended
protocol to make them useless.
Like in the raw Canetti model, we assume a corrupted basic agent to stay in this
condition for the rest of its life. Thus, the probability of having an agent community with
less than n=3 corrupted members decreases over time.
In the basic protocol, we do not require any time constraints for the migration process
or the execution on a host. Therefore, a malicious host can grind the whole community
to a halt by refusing to send an agreement message after receiving an agent with the
request to host it. The lack of a timeout allows a malicious host to retain the agent
forever by never issuing a migration request. This does not change anything in the basic
model because at that moment the agent is already corrupted.
The advantages of distributed computations are the guaranteed condentiality of
data and the correct execution of an user-dened functionality as long as less than n=3
of the agents are corrupted or spied out. This is a direct result given by [Can01]. For a
hostile environment like the one autonomous agents are living in, this is already a quite
strong guarantee. Nonetheless, for practical reasons we are going to handle the problems
mentioned above by requiring the agents of one community to control each other and, if
necessary to clean an agent that became corrupted. Additionally, we introduce a suitable
resharing method that is performed regularly.
4 An extension
The previously discussed security risks mainly arise from the transition from one Canetti
Slice to another. So, this section is dedicated to enrich our model with techniques to se-
cure the transition by share renewal as well as detecting and cleaning of corrupted agents.
Additionally, we introduce some features like authentication and local computations on
public data. The latter enables the originator to decide whether a particular computa-
tion needs to be performed securely and with non-negligible communication complexity.
Otherwise, they could be performed insecurely but locally and eÆciently.
If code and data are digitally signed, any changes can be detected. Obviously, the
code can be signed by the originator. The public data is always signed by the host that
produced it. But who signs the private data? It should be signed by the community c
because of the following two reasons:
{ If an agent gets lost, the community is able to replace it by copying the code and
reconstructing the private data.
{ No host can join a distributed computation with correct shares and insert signed but
faked shares into the agent's database without being detected later on.
We assume the existence of a public-key-infrastructure with certication authorities. So,
everybody is able to get someone's public key in a reliable way. This implies, that every
host can check if the code and/or data of the agent has been changed without permission.
4.1 The extended agent
Entering the ith host H
ji
, the agent A
j
consists of
{ a list K = [(p
0
; s
0
; O; c;H
0
; t
m
; t; sig
H
0
(h(p
0
)); sig
c
(h(s
0
jOjcjH
0
jt
m
jt)));
(p
jk
; s
jk
; sig
H
jk
(h(p
jk
)); sig
c
(h(s
jk
)))j1  k  i  1]
{ a signature sig
O
(h(C))
whereby for all 0  k  i   1, p
jk
is the public knowledge and s
jk
is the set of shares
added by host H
jk
(H
j0
= H
0
). The set s
0
additionally contains some system information
like shares of:
{ c's private key
{ counters c
A
l
for each agent A
l
(needed for the migration process of agent A
l
)
{ c
m
that counts the number of migration trials in current migration process
{ the list Q that is the queue for the concurrent migration requests
{ the location list L
c
{ n history lists L
h
j
{ Q[1]
From the last three entries the agent possesses enough shares to be able to reconstruct
the data for its own. The initial shares are concatenated with a number t
m
that limits
the number of migration trials within one migration process, the maximum execution
time t on one host, the originator's name O, the community's identity c and the initial
host H
0
.
4.2 The extended protocol
In the extended protocol, the time available for the migration process and execution is
controled because every host owns a timer t
A
j
for every agent of c. When a new host is
computed for an agent, every host resets the timer that has been assigned to the agent.
After a successful migration all current timer values are submitted to the new host by his
predecessor. As soon as a particular timer t
A
j
runs out, the host calls the sub-protocol
count to increase a counter c
A
j
. For details about count see gure 2. When the counter
The functionality of sub-protocol count
1. Increase the distributed counter c
A
l
by 1
2. If c
A
l
> 2n=3, then
increase c
m
by 1
If c
m
 t
m
, then
execution of sub-protocol ext migrate
Else
execution of sub-protocol create
Fig. 2. Functionality of count
exceeds 2n=3 and not too many trials have failed, a migration process for agent A
j
starts
by calling the sub-protocol ext migrate (see gure 3). Otherwise the agent is recreated.
Before executing an agent, every host checks the correctness of all signatures. By this,
The functionality of sub-protocol ext migrate
1. If the input contains "Q" then
If not more than 2n=3 of "Q+" or "Q " calls arrived
store this request and exit.
Else
If #"Q+"> 2n=3 then inform every host to update L
c
and to send all messages
that have been buered for the rst element in Q to the new host.
Send a termination message to the old host.
Call sub-protocol reshare and remove the rst element of Q.
Else c
m
:= c
m
+ 1;
If c
m
> t
m
then call sub-protocol create for Q[1] and exit.
If Q 6= fg then continue the protocol for the rst element of Q.
Else exit.
Else
append the request to Q
If jQj  1 then exit.
2.{5. analogously to steps 2{5 of gure 1
6. Every host sends L
h
j
= fH
0
; H
j1
; : : : ; H
ji
g to H
j(i+1)
a
.
7. Every host starts a timer t
A
j
.
a
In case of the renewal of an agent, the hosts additionally send their shares of
the new agent to the new location.
Fig. 3. Functionality of ext migrate
the data/code integrity is veried, too. To enable the host to retrieve the relevant public
keys the history list L
h
j
is submitted to the new host by all other hosts. The history
lists of the other agents are submitted, too. This guarantees the integrity of those lists.
A distributed storage is also possible and more eÆcient, but for sake of simplication not
used here. If the integrity of any of the private data or the code is violated, the host calls
for a sub-protocol create (see gure 4) that prompts the community to distributedly
compute a new agent and to send it to a new host. This agent has no initial public data.
The functionality of sub-protocol create
1. If the request contains "A
k
", then check if the sender of the request is the
current host of A
k
. If not, then exit.
2. Fix a code C and the signature sig
O
(h(C)) by a majority decision
3. Computation of new shares s
0
; : : : ; s
i
a
4. Fixing the history L
h
j
by a majority decision and append the separator .
5. Execution of ext migrate
a
This can be done analogously to [OY91]
Fig. 4. Functionality of create
After receiving a positive agreement response concerning the execution of an agent
from a new host, a host calls run((r;"Q+"); L; ext migrate). In case of a negative re-
sponse, run is called with "Q ". The protocol is executed as soon as more than 2n=3
calls for "Q+" resp. "Q " from dierent servers arrived. It instructs the hosts to up-
date their L
c
, to send the buered messages to the new host and to renew the shares
by invocating the sub-protocol reshare. If the agent's shares never expire, the \super-
adversary" might be able to collect enough of them to gain full information about the
community's secret. Therefore, it is inevitable to renew the shares. We propose the use of
the technique of [OY91] because it is based on the secure distributed computation scheme
in [BGW88] which we used before. The method makes use of the veriable secret sharing
scheme which is based on Shamir's secret sharing algorithm presented in [Sha79]. If the
\super-adversary's" abilities are more restricted, one could delay the resharing process
until the rst agent wants to migrate for the x
th
time. The number x depends on the
assessment of the network and can be counted by the lists L
h
k
.
The functionality of sub-protocol reshare
1. Distributed computation of new share sets s
kl
and s
0
for each k; l as per
[OY91]
2. Distributed signature of the new sets with the private key of the community
3. Each host deletes the old shares.
Fig. 5. Functionality of reshare
Initialisation
1. The originator divides D in n shares and distributes them among the agents. Fur-
thermore every agent gets some public data p
0
and a code C.
2. H
0
computes a list L
c
= [H
11
; : : : ;H
n1
] containing the hosts of the rst Canetti Slice.
3. For all 1  j  n, the host H
0
sends the message (A
j
,"Agree?",H
0
) to Host H
j1
and
starts timers t
A
j
.
4. As long as there is any j with outstanding positive response:
If any timer t
A
j
runs out or H
j1
sends "no", then
compute a new host H
j1
for A
j
, send (A
j
,"Agree?",H
0
) to H
j1
and
restart timer t
A
j
.
else
If H
j1
sends "yes" then t
A
j
is stopped and H
0
makes an endorsement about j.
5. H
0
sends L
c
and for every 1  j  n, a list L
h
j
= fH
0
g containing the previous hosts
of agent A
j
to all members of L
c
. Additionally, each host gets timers t
A
1
= : : : =
t
A
n
= 0.
Migration cycle of A
j
on host H
ji
(i  1)
1. H
ji
checks sig
O
(h(C)).
2. H
ji
makes a decision dec 2 f"yes","no"g about the execution of A
j
.
If dec = "yes", all timers t
A
k
are continued.
3. If H
j(i 1)
= H
0
, then deliver(dec, H
0
).
Else
Incoming location lists L
c
and history lists L
h
k
sent by any server are stored.
If more than 2n=3 lists L
c
are available, a majority decision is made to x L
c
.
If L
c
exists, H
ji
executes deliver(dec, L
c
).
If dec = "yes",
while for at least one k the list L
h
k
is not yet xed do
as soon as for one k, 1  k  n, more than 2n=3 lists L
h
k
are available
L
h
k
is xed by a majority decision.
Else H
ji
deletes the agent.
4. H
ji
checks for 1  k  i   1 the signatures of s
jk
by means of L
h
j
. The public
knowledge p
jk
0
is checked by all entries of L
h
j
after the last separator .
If the check of any s
jk
or the code fails then call run((r;"A
j
"); L
c
; create) and delete
A
j
.
else start the execution of A
j
.
5. During the execution, the following events may occur
{ Calls of the function run((r;"Q+"); L
c
; ext migrate) in case of a positive agree-
ment response from any host. Call of run((r;"Q "); L
c
; ext migrate) in case of
a negative response.
{ Local computations on shares
{ Invocation of a subroutine run(r; L
c
;X) for distributed computations
{ Updates of the set of shares s
ji
{ Forwarding of messages to A
j
{ Delivery of messages by execution of deliver(L
0
;m)
{ A timer t
A
k
runs out. Then call run((r;"A
k
"); L
c
; count).
{ A
j
demands its migration, therefore, H
ji
calls run((r;"A
j
"); L
c
; ext migrate)
{ Receipt of the next host H
j(i+1)
. H
ji
exits the event loop.
6. After receiving the next host H
j(i+1)
, the agent A
j
is sent to it with the plea for an
agreement response.
While there is no termination response from c:
If there is a positive answer from H
j(i+1)
, then H
ji
calls
run((r;"Q+"); L
c
; ext migrate).
If there is a negative answer from H
j(i+1)
, then H
ji
calls
run((r;"Q "); L
c
; ext migrate).
If a timer t
A
k
runs out, H
ji
calls run((r;"A
k
"); L
c
; count).
H
ji
deletes A
j
and stops all timers. The current values of all timers are transmitted
to H
j(i+1)
.
4.3 Discussion
Our novel approach improves the security of mobile computations signicantly. In par-
ticular, the following security features are achieved:
{ Authentication of the agents.
{ Sensible data can be kept condential since they are stored distributedly and any
computation on them is done distributed, too.
{ Violation of code/data integrity can be detected. Code and private data can be re-
stored.
{ For every sensible computation we use n=3-robust protocols which provide us with
guarantees for their private and correct execution.
{ Using timeouts, we guarantee that a malicious host is not able to ood the community
with useless requests for a long time. An agent cannot be held forever.
{ Malicious routing is impossible as long as less than 1=3 of the agents are corrupted
at the same time.
{ The community is self-repairing. Therefore, in a real system the preconditions for
Canetti's security model could be met at every time.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst model that achieves security for mobile
computations. We are convinced of its importance for future design of multi-agent systems
even though its communication complexity is high.
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A Illustration of Canetti's model
The following gure 6 illustrates the concurrent execution of three protocols 
1
; 
2
and

3
on N servers. Thereby, 
i
is an n
i
-party protocol (1  i  3). The adversary A of a
protocol 
i
is able to read and write on the communication tapes of each participiciant
of this protocol. In the gure, this is represented by the arrows.
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Fig. 6. The real-life-model with multi-party protocols 
1
; 
2
and 
3
